Appendix A Optimal Offers for Two-Offer Case for Market with Fixed Threshold Price
A buyer who can make a maximum of two offers maximizes the expected consumer surplus: It can also be shown that the model converges since p 0 monotonically decreases and p n monotonically increases with increasing n and p 0 and p n are bounded.
Appendix B Seller's Decision in Terms of Offer Acceptance
We want to show that any seller with valuation lower than s strictly prefers to accept the offer p j now instead of waiting for better offers in the future if a seller with valuation s is willing to accept the offer. Define V(s) to be the equilibrium payoff at time j + 1 of a seller with valuation s and let Q(s) be the discounted probability of a trade for the seller s. Suppose a seller with valuation s chooses to accept a offer p j , then p j -s $ δ S V(s) must hold. Now consider a seller with a valuation s' < s. We want to show that a seller with valuation s' is also better off to accept the offer p j now and thus p j -s' $ δ S V(s'). The seller with valuation s imitates s' only if the expected payoff is at least as high as the payoff he expects when he is following his own equilibrium behavior. Thus
Intuitively, it is clear that a seller with valuation s' (remember s' < s) loses more money due to the discount factor than a seller with valuation s and thus the seller with valuation s' will always accept an offer if a seller with valuation s is willing to accept the offer.
Appendix C Behavior in Markets with N and Infinite Offers and One-Sided Uncertainty
The equilibrium is described as a collection of functions , where is a probability distribution repre- 
where σ j is the indifference valuation in j.
This yields the following function for the buyer's optimal offering behavior and the seller's cutoff valuations:
The proof is by induction on n. With one period remaining, the buyer wishes to choose p according to the following program:
[ ]
With i periods remaining, the buyer's expected consumer surplus is given by
Assume by the induction hypothesis that (1 ) 1 ; 1: 2 2 ( 1 ) ( Fudenberg et al. (1985) show that the latter-described equilibrium is a unique equilibrium in the infinite-horizon game. The buyer's equilibrium offer p j , the seller's indifference valuation σ j , and the expected consumer surplus u j for period j in the infinite horizon game is given by 
Appendix D Behavior in Markets with Infinite Offers and Two-Sided Uncertainty
In the case of two-sided uncertainty, the assumption of a known buyer's valuation WTP is relaxed. The seller only assesses the buyer's valuation to be given by the distribution F(WTP) with a positive density f(WTP) on [WTP low , WTP high ]. In this case, the buyer must be concerned about the information that her offer reveals to the seller, and the seller must interpret this offer as an indication of the buyer's true willingnessto-pay carefully.
The separating equilibrium that distinguishes high valuation buyers from low valuation buyers is achieved through discounting over time. The class of high valuation buyers is described by a valuation that is higher than a certain cutoff value β j in j: WTP > β j . To determine the equilibrium, we must follow an iterative procedure: First, compute the offer sequence and indifference values that result after the buyer's willingness-to-pay has been revealed according to the case with one-sided uncertainty. Determine the offer sequence for the buyer with the highest willingness-to-pay WTP = WTP high and her optimal number of offers.
Second, stepwise decrease WTP from WTP high by some small amount ΔWTP > 0 so that the buyer WTP is indifferent between offering p(WTP) and p(WTP -ΔWTP). With decreasing WTP there will come a point β 1 at which no seller will accept the offer p(β 1 ). All buyers with WTP < β 1 will thereby offer too low and in this way signal their low willingness-to-pay. For a buyer with willingness-to-pay WTP > β 1 the value of the subsequent offers can easily be calculated since she already revealed her private information. All buyers with WTP < β 1 will wait for subsequent rounds to reveal their true willingness-to-pay. For these buyers, we go back to the first step and determine the offer sequence and the optimal number of offers for a buyer with willingness-to-pay WTP = β 1 . This process is repeated until the offers of all buyers WTP ∈ [WTP low , WTP high ] are determined. By this procedure the NYOP seller has disjunctive classes of buyers that reveal their true willingness-to-pay in the first round (e.g., buyers with WTP ∈ (β 1 , WTP high ]), in the second round (e.g. ,buyers with WTP ∈ (β 2 , β 1 ]), and so on and so forth.
In equilibrium, high valuation buyers reveal their private information by submitting an offer that is strictly increasing in WTP. The seller can then infer the buyer's WTP by inverting the offer schedule p(WTP) by calculating WTP = p -1 (p). Proof: Suppose buyer WTP chooses pretending to be buyer WTP shade by offering the offer p. This means she is trying to imitate the behavior of a low valuation buyer although she actually has a higher valuation of WTP for the product offered. Then her expected consumer surplus is determined by the first offer utilizing LB as the starting point plus all other discounted surpluses that make use of the belief being updated by a rejection in the preceding offering round: 
Performing the summation for the geometric progression yields dp dp dp dp dp σ σ σ σ δ σ σ
At this point, the buyer can calculate her optimal offer p* by substituting WTP shade = WTP. This means the buyer has the same incentives to offer p* as to shade her offers. This also implies , and shade dWTP dWTP dp dp = 1 dWTP d d W T P dp dp w dp dp dp dp dp
